approach has revolved around whether Protagoras is a relativist or an infallibilist, and whether Plato is successful in refuting the position so presented.
iii I propose that Socrates is not showing that the Protagorean position is internally inconsistent, impossible, or contradictory. Cornford is closer to the mark when he argues that the heart of the argument is whether other ordinary criteria that we have about knowledge must be abandoned if we adhere to the Protagorean position. But I wish to show that the argument here is decisive because Theaetetus the individual cannot accept the Protagorean argument because of his own activity and commitments as a mathematician, and not simply because it is in conflict with ordinary doxai more generally. For, Socrates acknowledges that a different person-Protagoras-in the end might still reject the arguments made here. Plato does not intend us as readers to understand the argument against Protagoras as a purely abstract one about inconsistent premises or ideas. Instead, Socrates' dialectical argument against Protagoras depends upon the beliefs and the character of Theaetetus for its success.
Understanding the refutation of the definition of knowledge as perception as dependent upon who Theaetetus is as an individual, and what he already believes, also makes more sense of the famous passage on Socratic midwifery. For, in that passage, Socrates claims that he helps others to give birth to ideas already within them (150d2-d9).
If the argument against Protagoras is merely intended to be an argument about the internal consistency of someone else's position, then it is hard to see how anything Theaetetus has within him is relevant to that argument. I suggest instead that understanding the argument against the Protagorean position as arising from Theaetetus' own beliefs also makes better sense of how Socrates understands the elenchic process to work, as expressed in the metaphor of a midwife.
Below I shall first examine how Protagoras' position here is internally consistent and yet rejected by Theaetetus because of his own beliefs about knowledge and expertise. iv I then offer a few reflections on the dialectical nature of the argument in the Theaetetus. In particular, I examine how early sections of the dialogue (prior to the initial definition of knowledge) are central to the rejection of the Protagorean standpoint. v The
Theaetetus dialectically affirms the value of the philosophical while acknowledging the existence of a non-philosophical competing intellectual position.
II.
Theaetetus first proposes a definition of knowledge as "simply perception Socrates implies that this rejection of the difference between a thing and an appearance has certain appeals: for example, it seems to avoid some of the problems with characterizing the relationship between an appearance or representation and the thing itself, through eliminating the distinction altogether. Such a definition of knowledge at least gives knowledge the characteristic of infallibility. Socrates hints at this advantage to his theory when he says perception seems to be a worthy candidate for knowledge, because it is "unerring," as is appropriate for knowledge (152c4-5). We can bypass the difficulty of determining who is right or wrong about the temperature of the wind itself by suggesting that knowledge is not about comparing two or more perceptions with one another, or comparing perception and some external reality; rather, the question was wrongly posed to begin with. Whatever I perceive is already knowledge for me.
There has been some dispute over what precise position Protagoras takes here:
relativism has been the most common account. While many have held that Protagoras is a relativist (see e.g, Bostock 1988; McDowell 1973; Sayre 1969; and Vlastos 1956 ),
Burnyeat has given one of the most precise accounts of that position and what he sees as its inconsistency (Burnyeat 1976 ). Burnyeat argues that Protagoras is a relativist, that is, he claims that every judgment is true for the person whose judgment it is. That is, if it seems to x that p, then it is true for x that p. If I feel that the wind is cold, then for me it is cold; but if you feel that it is hot, it really is hot to you. Similarly, judgments about more complex matters are also relative: if x judges that p is true, then p is true for x. I generally agree with Burnyeat's assessment of Protagoras as a relativist at the beginning of the discussion between Socrates and Theaetetus. However, the Protagorean position develops beyond a simple relativism much later in the discussion, when the relativistic theory of truth is put into the larger context of a theory about wisdom and persuasion.
This later section will prove to be significant for understanding how and why Socrates thinks that Protagoras' theory can withstand some of the arguments against him. (I delay discussion of these differences from Burnyeat's presentation of Protagoras until later in the paper when more of the Protagoras' position has been laid out.)
One interesting alternative to relativism has been offered by Fine, who argues that
Protagoras is an infallibilist (Fine 1998) . According to Fine, Protagoras holds that all beliefs are true simpliciter, i.e., just because they are believed. If A believes p, then p is true (not just true for A). Fine suggests that the infallibilist position is more likely because, among other reasons, the qualifiers ("for you" and the like) are at times omitted in the course of the discussion, a problem which has often been noted (cf. Vlastos 1956; Sayre 1969) . If the qualifiers are sometimes dropped, then perhaps Protagoras is not really a relativist, but only an infallibilist. However, Socrates includes the qualifiers both in his initial description of the position and at nearly all of the major restatements of it. For example, consider the strength of: " ὥστε εἴτε τις εἴναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς πρός τι ῥητέον αὐτῳ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι ("so if someone says that anything 'is,' he must mention that it is to or of or relative to something, and also if he says it 'becomes'") (160b7-9).
vi Fine also suggests that since the argument against Protagoras is effective against the infallibilist position, but not the relativistic one, infallibilism is a more likely position.
But as I will argue below, Socrates' comments suggest that he himself does not think that the arguments he and Theaetetus have given would be decisive for Protagoras (see 171c-d); this is all the more reason to suppose that infallibilism is not the position being argued against.
Socrates responds that Protagoras' theory is "not a common" theory. To a certain extent, the remainder of his argument against Protagoras might be summed up in this phrase: "not common" (οὐ φαυλον; found twice, at 151e9 and 152d2 what is, then nothing "is" (εἶναι) in itself, but everything is "coming to be" (γίγνεσθαι) as a result of motion (157a1-2). It is a mistake to talk about the reality of an apple; rather, we ought to talk about the reality of the perception, which arises from the combined motion of the perceiving power and the motion of the perceived. Something in the perceiver's perceptive powers combines with the motion of the perceived entity, to produce what has reality for us. This perception is constantly arising and therefore never truly static. In fact, it is a misnomer to talk about the perceiver's powers, as if they were things, or the thing that is going to be perceived-we ought to talk about two motions that combine to produce another motion. The perceived apple is not an entity, but a process;
neither are the forces which give rise to this perception things, but instead processes.
This metaphysical position is not in itself absurd. On the contrary, Socrates suggests that many of the great thinkers of the past-Empedocles, Herclitus, past poets and dramatists-held a similar view of the universe as a place of flux and change.
Moreover, many natural phenomena would seem to arise out of processes in motion, such as fire, heat, and perhaps even the animating life force of the soul itself. This is all additional evidence in favor of the Protagorean metaphysical view. What is absurd, on this view, is the present state of language, which mistakenly talks about things instead of processes, and typically uses the word εἶναι instead of γίγνομαι. But we could just as easily say that our language ought to be reformed, so that it better reflects the true nature of reality, as reject the Protagorean theory on this basis alone.
As the first section of refutation begins, Socrates asks Theaetetus whether he finds this theory appealing. Theaetetus replies that he does not know whether Socrates himself believes in the position that Socrates has just expressed, or is just laying it out for the sake of argument. Socrates emphasizes that the whole point is whether Theaetetus believes it:
"But you must have courage and patience; answer like a man whatever appears to you (φαίνεταί σοι) to be true about the things I ask you" (157d3-4). In this refutation of knowledge as reducible to appearances, Socrates suggests that the only way in which a reliable judgment about the fruitfulness of the idea is to be found in how the idea appears to Theaetetus. A third set of objections comes with the introduction of a counterexample in which a person can perceive something, and yet not know it, as when we can hear people speaking a foreign language and yet do not understand it (163b). In such cases, we perceive but do not know. In addition, because the knowledge of the words' meaning is separable from the perception of the sounds, this also suggests that when we do know a language, the knowledge is not to be found in the perceptions of the sounds themselves.
That is, the ordinary use of the term "know" when I say that I "know" what someone else is saying, has content beyond perceiving that someone else is saying something.
Similarly, I can say that I know my friend when I shut my eyes, even though I cannot perceive him. We ordinarily think of perception and knowledge differently, in our use of those terms in everyday life. However, Socrates also objects to these arguments, on the grounds that they have only been "getting words to agree consistently," like professional debators (164d). Socrates does not state explicitly which words they have been trying to get to agree. But in light of the later discussion of the terms knowledge, wisdom, and perception, perhaps Socrates' point is that these examples rely upon ordinary senses of the words "know" and "perceive" which could in principle be used differently. For example, Protagoras could say that remembering a friend is a kind of a perception, too, and so would of course be included as an instance of knowledge. Or, Protagoras might very well say that when we perceive sounds in a foreign language that we do not understand, we have not really perceived them fully or adequately; we still do not need to claim that knowledge is distinct from perception. Again, the out-of-the-ordinary nature of the theory is not in itself a decisive objection to Protagoras' theory.
ix It is at this point that Socrates provides his "spirited rescue" of the orphaned argument. Theaetetus seems ready to give up the Protagorean view, and yet Socrates is insistent that a further defense is needed before a full evaluation of knowledge as perception can be made. Socrates himself is not convinced that Protagoras' theory is being rejected for the right reasons. The difficulties posed in the first section of the dispute do not get to the heart of the differences between the Protagorean view of knowledge and that of Theaetetus.
Socrates-as-Protagoras asks that the position of knowledge as perception itself be refuted-he specifically asks his objectors to prove either that a person's perceptions are not private events, or that a private perception can "be" for more than just the individual percipient. That is, "Protagoras" places the burden of refuting his theory upon directly refuting the fundamental claims made about perception, and not the various consequences that one would have to reluctantly accept if it were true. "Protagoras" is not interested in the implausibility of his theory, but rather in whether anyone can overcome the claim that perceptions are ultimately private and individual, such that they alone can claim to be knowledge.
To complicate matters further, Socrates-as-Protagoras develops an alternative theory of wisdom as distinct from knowledge. The wise person is not the person who knows more than others. Rather, he or she "can change the appearances"; the wise person "in any case where bad things both appear (φαίνεται) and are for one of us, works a change and makes good things appear and be (φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι) for him" (166d7-9).
Every appearance or perception is equally true. However, some positions are admittedly better or worse than others, and the wise person can effect a change in others' appearances such that they have better perceptions than they did before. To say that the things that appear to the wise person are "true" or truer than the perceptions of others is a misnomer, for they are simply better and not truer. A wise doctor can make his patients perceive that eating healthy foods is good, while eating unhealthy foods is bad. The doctor does not possess a truth that the patient lacks, but rather a capacity to effect the change in the patient's perceptions in a way that will benefit the patient.
Socrates-as-Protagoras develops a theory that is now closer to pragmatism than to pure relativism, although he maintains relativism with respect to the domain of truth. We can still say that wise people exist; however, wisdom is not the possession of knowledge but the capacity to change worse appearances to better ones. "Knowledge" and "truth" are terms to be applied only to the domain of perception, while "better" and "worse" apply to comparisons between perceptions.
x Truth then becomes a concept subordinate to the category of the "beneficial"; knowledge is less important than the ability to persuade.
Protagorean relativism as presented in the Theaetetus weakens, rather than strengthening, the centrality of truth and knowledge in living well. This is a sensible stance for a rhetorician to take, for then rhetoric, and not philosophy, is then the most powerful form of wisdom.
The heart of Socrates' objection to the Protagorean redefinition of wisdom is that ordinarily, we do call people wise because they are knowledgeable. This is clearest in the case of technical skills: when we are in distress, or on the battlefield, or in a storm, we turn to those people whom we think possess knowledge that we lack. Socrates says, "In emergencies-if at no other time-you see this belief. When they are in distress, on the battlefield, in sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each sphere as to God, and look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely this one thing-knowledge (εἰδέναι)" (170a8-b2 Protagoras can meaningfully reiterate his own claim that wisdom is an ability to change the appearances, to give them "better" perceptions rather than worse ones, for some specific purpose (e.g., in order to pass a law that will benefit the city, or to get someone to take a dose of medicine that will make her healthier). Thus far there is no inconsistency in the Protagorean position; nor is it completely unreasonable. All that Socrates has shown in the course of his argumentation is once again that the Protagorean position is quite out of the ordinary.
III.
The key argument against Protagoras takes place from 170d-171c. This argument attempts to show that relativism is self-defeating at some level. However, while the argument is sufficient for Theaeteteus to reject Protagoras' position, Socrates also makes clear that Protagoras himself need not concede defeat to Socrates.
The steps of the argument proceed as follows: xii 1. According to Protagoras, a judgment a person makes is true for that person.
2. Others may disagree with your judgment; in such cases, for those other people, your belief is false and not true. This can be applied to Protagoras' own beliefs such that:
3. Protagoras' belief is true for him, but false for the majority of men.
"[T]
he more those to whom it does not seem to be the truth outnumber those to whom it does, so much the more it isn't than it is" (171a2-4). Because the judgment is not for more people than it is, the judgment considered in itself "is not" more than it "is."
5. Protagoras must admit that the contrary of his opinion is true, since others believe that his opinion is false. That is, his own theory requires him to admit to its falsity.
6. As a result, "the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not even for himself" (171c5-6).
We ought to more closely examine this argument. For, this argument would appear more than the others to be a purely logical argument, one which shows that Protagoras' system is internally inconsistent, and therefore not acceptable even to him.
However, here is where Socrates makes his strange remark that Protagoras himself probably would not accept the conclusion of this argument:
Hence it is likely that Protagoras, being older than we are, really is wiser as well; and if he were to stick up his head from below as far as the neck just here where we are, he would in all likelihood convict me twenty times over of talking nonsense, and show you up too for agreeing with me, before he ducked down to rush off again. But we have got to take ourselves as we are, I suppose, and go on saying the things which seem to us to be (171c9-d7).
Why does Socrates think he will reject it? It is simply that Protagoras will say anything to win an argument, even if he knows his own position to be indefensible? Burnyeat (1976) Burnyeat argues that Protagoras must mean that truth concerns more than individual perceptions. As Burnyeat puts it, "Protagoras' theory is, after all, a theory of truth and a theory of truth must link judgments to something else-the world, as philosophers often put it, though for a relativist the world has to be relativized to each individual" (Burnyeat 1976 ). xv However, one must ask whether this is really so obvious:
is the Protagorean theory primarily a theory about truth, or a position that claims that demotes the importance of truth in relation to other concepts instead? While Socrates-asProtagoras does claim that truth is relative to the individual, the speech from 166a-168c
suggests that truth is a concept that is less important to Protagoras' thought than the wise person's ability to change the appearances. Protagoras says that truth is a term that only tells us something about a person's beliefs; truth is only-one could even say, "merely"-the truth for someone. Protagoras seems to want to weaken, not strengthen, the idea of the truth in order to make room for persuasion. In other words, Protagoras' discussion of the wise as the beneficial suggests that "truth" is somewhat overblown as a concept; what is really important is there is belief and appearance, and the benefits of taking a certain point of view, benefits which are highly dependent upon context (166e-167d). There, his models of wisdom are the doctor, the politician, and the person who can persuade, i.e., the rhetorician (167b-c). In this sense, Protagoras is not a simple relativist, as he had at first appeared to be.
Socrates' argument presupposes that if people disagree about what they believe, there is some need to come to a resolution of the difference. This is because we do not just have our own perceptual experiences; it is because we as human beings tend to make truth claims about others' beliefs as well. For Socrates disagreements about the truth are important; they require some attention. Socrates states that other people believe that Protagoras' belief is false; for them, it really is false. Protagoras might agree; however, it should be of little concern to Protagoras that others believe his theory to be false, because truth is not as important a concept for Protagoras as it is for Socrates. Protagoras says that disagreements can be resolved through changing the appearances, that is, changing the particular beliefs that a person has. Wisdom is this ability to change others' beliefs or appearances; so the task of resolving differences between perceptions (if resolution is required at all) properly would belong to rhetoric, and not to philosophy. Protagoras has removed the idea of truth from the public "world" altogether.
Other arguments that presuppose a public, intersubjective notion of truth as the foundation for an attack on Protagoras are going to fall prey to similar problems. The person who wants to claim that when we say, "x is good" we already mean "x is truly good," is already presupposing that "truth" as a term applies to some part of the world outside of perception. But this is exactly what is at issue. Protagoras can always say that he is not using "truth" in the way that others ordinarily do. He does not apply it to judgments about the value of perceptions-that is where the term "good" is applicable.
Protagoras emphasizes that this is in part a terminological dispute when he says that some people who are "inexperienced" (ἀπειρίας) call what is a good perception a true perception (167b2); we can only compare perceptions against one another by attending to whether they are good, wholesome, beneficial, and so on.
Protagoras' speech from 166a-168b, then, embeds the problem of truth in a much saying after he has concluded his objections: "But so long as we keep within the limits of that immediate present experience of the individual which gives rise to perceptions and to perceptual judgments, it is more difficult to convict these latter of being untrue-but perhaps I'm talking nonsense. Perhaps it is not possible to convict them at all; perhaps those who profess that they are perfectly evident and are always knowledge may be saying what really is" (179c4-d1). He suggests that Protagoras' theory is internally consistent, and holds out the possibility that Protagoras could be right.
We have then at the end of the argument between "Protagoras" and Socrates/ Theaetetus two seemingly incommensurable positions: one that claims that a conception of knowledge must include the truth about judgments and what is, and one that favors persuasion and the ability to effect action as marks of wisdom while leaving truth to the realm of individual perception. However, there seems to be no obvious higher order perspective from which to judge the two positions, for the very criteria that could be used to make judgments about them are what is at issue in the first place. In addition, neither
Socrates nor Protagoras finds the opinions of the majority to be a sufficient guide to what is best. Instead, Socrates claims that we must continue our argument only with regard to the things that would seem to be true to Theaetetus and to Socrates (171d).
IV.
To sum up the previous section, Socrates' arguments against Protagoras above rely upon certain assumptions: 1. There are real experts, and we call them experts because of their knowledge. 2. Wisdom and knowledge are equivalent terms: we call people wise on account of their knowledge. 3. The truth or falsity of another person's beliefs is meaningful and important. Theories of knowledge should be in harmony with these basic ideas according to Socrates' line of argument; but it is unclear why one might begin with such presuppositions in the first place.
Plato does not offer an abstract or universal argument on behalf of these assumptions. Rather, the answer is given in terms of why Theaetetus the mathematician believes in them. Early in the dialogue Socrates asks Theaetetus several questions that address issues of expertise, knowledge, and wisdom, even before any formal definitions are sought (145c-146a). First, the concept of expertise arises in Socrates' initial question to Theaetetus. Theodorus has compared Theaetetus to Socrates. Socrates asks, if they were both holding lyres, and Theodorus said they were similarly tuned, should they just take Theodorus' word for it? Shouldn't they inquire into whether Theodorus was truly an expert in music? Theaetetus agrees that they ought to inquire into the matter. That is, Theaetetus affirms that simple acceptance of the authority of an expert on the basis of the opinions of others is insufficient. While Socrates runs though a number of different disciplines in which Theodorus could be an expert, it is when he comes to geometry that Theaetetus exclaims that there is no doubt that Theodorus is an expert geometer.
Theodorus seems to be a master of astronomy, arithmetic, and music, but Theaetetus seems less certain of these claims. We know that Theaetetus has already engaged in geometrical studies with Theodorus, but has not yet taken up these other areas, although he is anxious to do so (145c-d Although this passage is often overlooked, it seems important, for it is this equation between σοφία and ἐπιστήμη that Socrates-as-Protagoras denies at 166a-167b.
Theaetetus at this point hardly seems even to understand Socrates' question: perhaps it seems too general to be interesting. However, Socrates finds it important to ask whether Theaetetus equates wisdom and knowledge. Theaetetus as a mathematician has a commitment to and interest in understanding more abstract truths, and already considers acquisition of this sort of knowledge to be a mark of true wisdom. In geometry, proof of a mathematical claim takes place apart from the usefulness or applicability of the idea in the practical realm. Theaetetus already values universal knowledge over practical benefit before the first definition of knowledge is ever offered.
xviii
The third assumption outlined above-that we can and do meaningfully speak about the truth or falsity of others' beliefs -is ultimately grounded in Theaetetus' commitment to the ideals of theoretical expertise and wisdom. In describing judgment,
Socrates uses examples of experts in distinction from non-experts. The expert doctor can predict whether his patient will continue to have a fever or not better than the patient. An expert chef can predict whether her dish will turn out delicious better than the guests at dinner (178c-e). Mathematics requires an even stronger commitment to truth than medicine or cooking, however. Theaetetus' work as a geometer is not to show the practical value of a theorem, but to give a proof for why it must be true, a proof that can be demonstrated to others. Theaetetus already regards the truth as having intersubjective character before the more formal discussion of knowledge as perception ever begins.
Socrates is not here giving an argument that shows the internal inconsistency or the illogicality of the Protagorean view. Neither does he show that the Protagorean position is obviously unreasonable, for Protagoras develops a cohesive and meaningful theory. Rather, Socrates is concerned with whether his particular interlocutor, Theaetetus, can accept it. That is, Socrates is asking Theaetetus to make a judgment about the "reasonableness" of the Protagorean position, by examining the implications of that position and whether they are consistent with his own experiences as a knower. If knowledge is perception, then everything is in flux; our language does not accurately reflect the nature of reality; there are no experts in knowledge; and the mark of wisdom is merely persuasiveness rather than knowledge. Theaetetus cannot accept such conclusions because he enters into the conversation with beliefs that are at odds with such conclusions, beliefs that are grounded in his experience as a student of mathematics. But while Theaetetus rejects the Protagorean theory, Plato goes out of his way to say that Protagoras would not if he were present. Socrates cares most about whether Theaetetus can accept these conclusions, because (somewhat paradoxically) the truth is to be found in Theaetetus himself.
Thus, when Socrates describes his own method in the Theaetetus in the wellknown analogy of the midwife, he says that Theaetetus is pregnant, and Socrates' only job is "to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth" (150c1-2). He describes his conversations with other interlocutors:
At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid, but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress-a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that this is not due to anything that they have learnt from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things (πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ) which they bring forth into the light (150d2-d9).
There are three important features to Socrates' description of himself as midwife for the purposes of understanding the later argument against Protagoras. First, Socrates claims that he himself is past the age of "child-bearing" (149c4-5). Socrates says that he is not the one giving birth here, but is aiding Theaetetus to give birth to his own ideas. If we take the arguments against Protagoras to be a rejection of the inadequacy of the sophist's theory in abstraction from Theaetetus' beliefs, it would be hard to understand Socrates' claim of being "barren." If all along Socrates knew the problems with Protagoras' theory and could teach them, Theaetetus as a specific individual would be unimportant: anyone could answer these questions for him. In that case, Socrates would be no midwife but an expert. However, if the midwifery passage if taken seriously, it suggests that the answers to philosophical problems are inevitably sought in the soul of the individual. Socrates' questions really are designed to draw out Theaetetus' answers.
He wants to show the young mathematician why he, Theaetetus, does not really believe that knowledge is perception even if this initial definition at first appears right.
Second, Socrates claims that the process of philosophical childbirth is by its nature difficult and painful; he suggests that it is even worse than the pain experienced by women in childbirth, for while their physical labor ends within a relatively short time, those undergoing philosophical labor are up "day and night" (151a7; cf Hemmenway 1990). Socrates says that his art both helps to bring on these pains and to soothe them (151a 8). Socrates is clear that Theaeteus is one who is pregnant, and possibly already in labor. Just before the midwife analogy is offered, Theaetetus exclaims that he cannot stop worrying about the nature of knowledge when he has heard others speak on such topics (148e1-5). Neither his own nor others' answers seem sufficient, and yet he cannot stop wondering about the questions. As Roochnik has argued, Plato continually portrays Theaetetus as someone who is driven by a sense of wonder (θαυμάζειν) about the world (cf. Roochnik 2002 and Polanksky 1992) . The term θαυμάζειν occurs frequently in the Theaetetus (see, for example, 142a2; 142c5; 144a3; 144b6; 150d5; 161c3; 162c3; 162c8; cf. Roochnik 2002). Theatetetus is described as being willing to put his "heart" (προθυμία) into seeking to understanding whatever he is curious about (148d1-4). At 162c8, Theateteus describes himself as being in a state of amazement or wonder.
Socrates specifically connects this experience of wonder about the world to what characterizes the philosopher: "For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else" (155d1-3). Plato presents Theaetetus as someone who has this love of wisdom.
Considerable space at the beginning of the Theateteus is also devoted to Theaetetus' person: the first six pages of the dialogue center around his character and his work in mathematics (142a-148d). There, Theaetetus is described as intellectually gifted, mild in temper, and courageous (ἀνδρειον) (144a); his courage on the battlefield is also emphasized in the prologue (142b). Later in the dialogue, Socrates says that courage is necessary if Theaetetus is to continue to pursue the argument in which they are engaged (157d). That is, Socrates says that courage is closely connected to philosophical inquiry.
Theaetetus' sense of wonder, courage, and intelligence all contribute to his drive to go beyond the internally coherent but ultimately unsatisfying claims of Protagoras that there are no universal truths to be sought. Theaetetus is not satisfied with Protagoras' practical theory because of these intellectual labor pains provoked by his philosophical curiosity, his desire to know. xix A third interesting feature of the midwife analogy is Socrates' claim to be a "matchmaker: just as midwives have a little-known ability to make matches that will produce the best physical children, Socrates says that he also knows what sorts of ideas will be the most fruitful for those whom he is assisting (150a1-b2; cf . Hemmenway 1990 xvi As Polansky says, the medical example can be persuasive since we can say both that all perceptions are true, and that all who are sick want to become healthy; so health can be a good without bringing in some "true" concept of health (see Ronald M. Polansky,
